Trumbull himself had recognized the existence of strong
constitutional doubts about his bill. He asserted that
the bill was valid under the Thirteenth Amendment -
since any encroachment upon a citizen's liberty was
"a badge of servitude" and hence within the
prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment, which congress
had the express authority to enforce. The opponents
of thbill remianed unconvinced. Their detailed attacks
on consititutional grounds are not reprinted, with the
exception of the addresses by Bingham and Senator Reverdy
Johnson [Dem., Md.] whose objections are illustrative
of others who expressed similar views.
Two important changes were made in section 1 of the
1866 bill during the congressional debates. The first
was the addition of a citizenship clause, making persons
born in the country United States citizens. Its purpose
was to remove the doubts about the Negro's citizenship
status that persisted because of the decision in Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857). The second change
was the dropping in the House of the clause in the originalbill
containing a general prohibition against discrimination
in civil rights on account of race. This had been done
to meet Bingham's objections, but did not go far enough
to secure his vote and that of those who felt as he
did.
Despite the objections of Republicans like Bingham,
the Civil Rights Bill passed the Senate on February
2, and the House on MArch 13, 1866. It was, however,
voted by President Andrew Johnson on March 27. The veto
message was based, in large part, upon the lack of constitutional
power in Congress to confer citizenship and abrogate
discriminatory state laws. It contains a good summary
of the constitutional opposition to the 1866 bill. The
Senate debate occasioned by Johnson's veto is not reprinted,
for it only repeated what was said earlier. On April
6 and 9, respectievely, the Senate and House voted (the
latter without debate), by 33 to 15 and 122 to 41, to
override the veto, and the bill became law.
The doubts raised by congressional opponents of the
1866 Civil Rights Act had great effect. It is true that
the relatively few cases on the matter ultimately divided
about evenly (though Justice Arthur Goldberg recently
stated that a majority upheld the constitutionality
of the Act, he apprently considered only the cases appearing
in official reports [Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,
292 (1964) ]. But the doubts persisted and led the congressional
advocates of federal enforccement of civil rights to
resolve such doubts by constitutional amendment. The
ultimate sollution was to recast section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act as section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This, we shall see, was the purpose avowed by most participants
in the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment.
The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to make
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 largely academic. That
is the case because section 1 of the new amendment contained
a general prohibition against discrimination in its
equal protection clause that was even broader that the
oringinal ban against
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the first federal
statute to provide broad protection in the field of
civil rights. Its purpose was to give to the newly emancipated
Negro equality with whites before the law. This purpose
was fully explained by Senator Lyman Trumbull [R., Ill.],
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in his address
on January 29, 1866, introducing the proposed legislation.
According to him, the purpose of the bill was to carry
into effect the Thirteenth Amendment by destroying the
discriminaiton against the Negro that existed in teh
laws of the southern states. In this way, the new statute
would (as Trumbull had expressed it a month earlier
in a speech not reprinted here) "provide for the
real freedom of their former slaves."
Trumbull tells us that "the basis of the whole
billl" was in its first section, which, as introduced
by him, provided (1) that there should be no discrimination
in civil rights on account of race; and (2) that inhabitants
of every race shall have the same right to contract,
sue, take and dispose of property, bring action and
give evidence, and to equal benefit of all laws for
the security of the person and property. This provision,
the senator went on, was intended to "secure to
all persons within the United States practical freedom."
Of particular interest to one concerned with civil rights
was Trumbull's answer to the query of Senator James
McDougall [Dem., Cal.], with regard to what was meant
by "civil rights." Trumbull replied that the
term was defined by the bill's first section and it
did not include political rights - and approach that
is certainly narrower then that used at the present
day.
The speech by Senator Willard Saulsbury [Dem., Del.],
illustrates the views of those who opposed all congressional
action in teh civil rights field. More important to
the student of legislative history was the opposition
based upon a claim of unconstitutionality, which found
voice in members of the Republican party who plainly
favored federal protection of civil rights. Foremost
among these was Representative John Bingham [R., Ohio],
whose views are of particular interest to us because
of the role he played in the drafting of the Forteenth
Amendment. When the Civil Rights Bill came before the
House in March, Bingham made a strong speech in opposition.
On March 9, he asserted that Congress had no power to
enact such law, on the gound that the constitutional
power to protect individual rights then rested only
in the states, not the federal government. He said that
the evils which the bill sought to remedy should be
dealt with by constitutional amendment - thus indicating
that his drafts of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendent
(infra p. 187) were intended to give constitutional
validity to the principles laid down in the 1866 Civil
Rights Act. Interestingly, he took a much broader view
of the term "civil rights" than Trumbull,
stating that it did embrace political rights.
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